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28 APR 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Staff C

SUBJECT : Exchange of Headquarters and Field Security Reviews,  
WILLOW Team Operations.

1. Attached hereto for your retention is a copy of a field dispatch prepared in response to questions raised by the Headquarters Security Review of WILLOW Team Operations, SGAW-3280, 19 November 1953, a copy of which you already have in your possession. Numbered identities referred to in this memorandum are from Attachment C of the Headquarters Review.
2. Of particular security significance in the field response are the following points:
  - a. The team leader RNCORDAIN, and two of the internal contacts, Identities 26 and 29, are known by RNPUTLOG, a captured APPLE team member.
  - b. A woman caretaker of the Farm safehouse, where WILLOW was trained in 1952, was discovered in April 1952 to have been in regular correspondence with her Communist husband though not a Communist herself. (The Farm was also used as a training site for APPLE.)
  - c. The Headquarters review's account of the team's 14 June 1952 encounter with Albanian border guards (paragraph 9, page 6) is significantly revised by the field in paragraph 1g of the field review. The latter does not indicate any prior knowledge of the team's activity by the border guards.
  - d. Although net compartmentation was a sought-for objective, sub-agents (for example Identity 4) at times contacted team members directly rather than through the principal agents, cut-outs and/or dead drops. In addition at least two of the sub-agents (Identities 4 and 7) are believed to have known of each other's participation in the net. Personal meeting

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security measures were taken, however, when sub-agents met team members. With respect to the whole problem of net operations, the field plans much more extensive training in agent techniques for all teams.

- e. When the team members were in Athens between missions, they are believed by the field to have been indiscreet in their conversations with other Albanians, despite thorough field security briefings and despite protestations to the contrary on their part. With respect to a similar situation in another Albanian operation, Headquarters is suggesting to the field that, when there is a period of several months between missions, ~~that~~ the agents be removed to Greek areas where there are no or very few Albanians, i.e., Crete, Rhodes, Mitylene, Salonika, Kavalla, Tripolis, etc.
  - f. WILLOW was well known to the Greek border unit personnel in Kastoria because of previous service for the Greeks.
  - g. WILLOW shared the same safehouse with a Greek team while in Greek control just prior to its first cross-border infiltration.
  - h. The field reported an inability to obtain adequate information from team members on net personalities. Headquarters has asked the field for further explanation of this particular problem with a view to including in future training programs some method of conditioning agents to solve it.
3. The field has also been asked to forward information covering the following still unanswered or unclear points:
- a. Selection and recruitment of AIRSHIP, AIRSLACK, and AIRWORTHY;
  - b. Net organization during the last 1952 mission and during the 1953 mission; and
  - c. Why the attempt to contact Identity 23 during the last 1952 mission was not possible.

Chief SE

Enclosure:

SGAA-8824, Kapok-2449, 9 March 1954,  
Security Review of WILLOW Team  
Operations.